As many creditors have unfortunately discovered, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sue the creditor for certain payments – called preferences – that the creditor received from the debtor prior to the bankruptcy.
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.
A recent decision by a New Jersey bankruptcy court scrambles the law regarding rejected trademark licenses.1 Crumbs was a multi-location bakery that also licensed its trademarks and trade secrets to third parties. In July of 2014 Crumbs filed a Chapter 11 reorganization case and in August of 2014 the court entered an order selling substantially all of the assets of Crumbs to LFAC2 free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests.
In a case that should cause lenders heartburn, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina recently ruled that common provisions in a Chapter 11 plan prevented the debtor’s lender from executing on a judgment against the non-debtor owner of the debtor.1 Biltmore is a corporation2 that operates manufactured home parks and sells and rents manufactured homes. McGee is the president and controlling shareholder of Biltmore. Biltmore filed Chapter 11 in January of 2011, and TD Bank was Biltmore’s largest secured creditor.
On August 26, 2014, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD), on several aspects of the plan of reorganization filed by debtor Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., a specialty chemicals manufacturing company, and its affiliated debtors.
On January 17, 2014 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a ruling in Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 13-13087 (KG), which highlights potential risks to both secured creditors and purchasers of claims in bankruptcy section 363 sales. The facts in Fisker are straightforward. Fisker was founded in 2007 to make high-end electric cars and was financed principally with federal and state government loans secured by some, but not all, of Fisker’s assets.
On July 24, 2013 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, applying an “investment plus” test, concluded that a Sun Capital private equity investment fund was engaged in a “trade or business” for purposes of determining whether the fund could be jointly and severally liable under ERISA for the unfunded pension withdrawal liability of the portfolio company.1 Two Sun Capital investment funds, conveniently named Sun Capital Partners III, LP (“Fund III”) and Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, (“Fund IV”) (the “Sun Funds”) collectively owned 100 percent of Scott Brass, Inc.
On November 28, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit published an opinion affirming the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the Mexican Plan of Reorganization (the “Concurso Plan”) of the Mexican glass-manufacturing company, Vitro, S.A.B.
The Bankruptcy Code provides a number of “safe harbors” for forward contracts and other derivatives. These provisions exempt derivatives from a number of Bankruptcy Code provisions, including portions of the automatic stay,1 restrictions on terminating executory contracts,2 and the method for calculating rejection damages.3 The safe harbor provisions also protect counterparties to certain types of contracts from the avoidance actions created under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the preference and fraudulent transfer statutes.4
On July 9, 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided in Sunbeam1 that the rejection of a trademark license by a bankrupt trademark licensor does not deprive the trademark licensee of its right to continue to use the trademark, and disagreed with the 1985 Fourth Circuit decision in Lubrizol2 that held to the contrary.3 In reaction to the Lubrizol decision, which held that the rejection of a license by a bankrupt licensor of intellectual property terminated the rights of the licensee, Congress enacted Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy